The deep reservoirs of good will America accumulated in East Asia during the cold war have not dissipated. The East Asian economic miracle (now reviving) could not have occurred without the stabilizing U.S. military presence, open American markets and the flow of investment, technology and ideas from American corporations.
These reservoirs of good will are now sustained by continuing (if often unintentional) benign postures. The U.S. military presence remains crucial. The booming American economy has helped Asia make a V-shaped recovery from the financial crisis. American universities continue to educate Asia’s best and brightest minds. Taiwanese and Korean students returning from America contributed to their national economic successes. Like a giant filtration machine, American society has nourished, developed and returned valuable Asian talent. This may well be America’s lasting legacy in Asia.
Paradoxically, when U.S. policymakers and congressmen consciously try to do good for Asian societies, the results are often less than benign. The crude export of their political values is often accompanied by smug undertones of cultural superiority. This is most evident in the U.S.-China relationship, probably the most important relationship of the 21st century. An accident of history–a common fear of the Soviet Union–drew America and China together. Deng Xiaoping’s forceful opening of the Chinese economy created another common interest. Tiananmen shook the relationship, which was further frayed by differences over Taiwan, the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, charges of espionage and illegal campaign contributions and, of course, human-rights issues.
What has saved the day is a growing silent awareness among Americans that China, for all its shortcomings, is heading in the right direction: opening Chinese markets and minds to the outside world. Among Chinese, there is also a growing awareness that Americans have no malevolent intentions, despite maladroit moves. The U.S.-China World Trade Organization deal hangs in the balance. But it is riding on a wave of common sense that could bring it safely to shore.
It is difficult for Americans to acknowledge that their actions have had negative consequences. Not all American responses during the financial crisis were positive or even helpful. China has been goaded and taunted by the U.S. Congress. Many Chinese believe that the U.S. bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade was intentional. The fiasco in Seattle, where American politicians put national interests ahead of global interests (despite advising the rest of the world to do the opposite) contributed to further disillusionment with the United States. Many Asians are troubled by the negative role models propagated by American cinema and television. They resent this cultural invasion.
Having made positive contributions, Americans are often puzzled that they are not universally liked. They find it difficult to understand the mixed responses they get from Asians. The forthcoming foreign-policy memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew will shed light on Asians’ ambivalence. Both positive and negative American contributions to the region are candidly spelled out. Americans may bristle at some of the passages; the truth can hurt. But they will learn.
Even if the U.S. government does nothing in Asia, the region will continue to be influenced massively by America. Each day the interconnectivity between Asia and America is growing, in trade, investment, tourism, communications. Healthy viruses from U.S. centers of excellence will naturally infect Asian societies. Any effort to prevent American influences through the Internet would be as futile as the Qing dynasty’s last effort to close China. The era of walls has gone.
Perhaps that is why some of America’s blunders haven’t generated a wave of anti-Americanism. Great forces are being unleashed in Asia. Economic success generates cultural confidence. There will soon be an Asian renaissance, as Asians rediscover their ancient roots. Asians will become more Asian, but need not become anti-American. The U.S. executive branch is capable of moving delicately. Other power centers, especially Congress, tend to be clumsy. How does one explain to Congress that the real issues in the WTO deal are not American jobs or human rights in China but the peace and security of East Asia? It is this uncertainty of American responses that casts a cloud over the region and explains Asian misgivings.
