If Madison at least had the advantage of a working consensus that somehow the federal government needed strengthening, the Soviet Union now takes up the dangerous task of constitutional change under opposite conditions. Soviet communism collapsed on the way to its diamond jubilee, leaving behind it a reflexive dislike of central political mechanisms even among citizens of Russia, the core republic of the old union. Last week’s grant of independence to the three Baltic republics is likely to inspire further separatism. Among them the 12 remaining Soviet republics contain five principal language groups, a population that is nearly half non-Russian and a dazzling variety of pre-Soviet national traditions. The republics are themselves subdivided: in the Ukraine last week, for example, the region of Crimea declared its own independence. At this heady moment, local considerations outweigh any conceivable common interests. Sometime in October, representatives of the republics will begin work toward a new Soviet constitution. Confederation would be a natural choice.

The weaknesses of confederation identified by Madison have not declined with time. If a nation is to be quarried out of the old Soviet Union, it will face all the classic problems of divided sovereignty: will there be one foreign policy, or many? Who will control the military? Will a single currency prevail? How will trade among the republics be regulated? It is impossible to say how the debate will resolve itself. But the American experience does give some guidance to the framers of the next Soviet constitution.

The U.S. Articles of Confederation, as adopted in 1781, reflected the strength of local loyalties. The 13 original states recognized a common interest in opposing Great Britain. They insisted, however, on their individual sovereignty. When Thomas Jefferson spoke of “my country,” he meant Virginia; John Adams described the Massachusetts delegation to the U.S. Congress as “our embassy.” The only union possible under such circumstances was a weak one-a “firm league of friendship,” as the Articles put it. Some of the attributes of sovereignty, such as the power to conduct foreign relations, were lodged in the national government. But it was power limited by the states’ reluctance to pay for central government. Congress had no authority to lay taxes. The states, meanwhile, breached powers clearly belonging to Congress, such as the right to approve treaties among states. Within Congress, the equality of states-each had one vote, regardless of population–guaranteed stalemate. Said Alexander Hamilton: “There is something … diminutive and contemptible in the prospect of a number of petty states, with the appearance only of union, jarring, jealous and perverse … weak and insignificant by their dissensions in the eyes of other nations.”

It is a past the Soviets seem condemned to repeat. The transitional regime announced last week resembles the classic confederations. Resolutions adopted by the Congress of People’s Deputies speak of the republics as “nations,” and declare that “each state shall be able to define on its own its form of participation in the union.” In the meantime, fundamental power is in the hands of the republics. A new lawmaking body, the Council of Republics, will have members appointed solely by leaders of the republics. Inside the council, each republic will have one vote. This creates a number of political anomalies: in theory, for example, the six Muslim republics will be in a position to outvote Russia, despite its possession of half the Soviet population. It also decreases the likelihood of cohesive action on genuinely common interests such as trade and the control of nuclear weapons.

Disunion is a political reality, though. The Soviets will have to endure it, just as the Americans did. The question is whether they will eventually uncover a community of interest underneath their myriad ethnic, ideological and historical conflicts. They do not have the luxury of working out their destiny in comparative isolation, like the United States in the 18th and 19th centuries. But faced with a difficult outside world, they may come to share the sense of urgency Benjamin Franklin voiced at the moment of breaking with Britain: “We must all hang together, else we shall all hang separately.”