Such talk is as overheated as the jungles of Basilan and Sulu, the southern Philippine islands that are home to the Abu Sayyaf. The campaign against the group, whose links to Al Qaeda are sketchy, may not even represent the most strategic blow against global terror. Certainly the deployment of 160 U.S. Special Forces commandos and an additional 500 support troops that is to take place over the next month doesn’t signal an Apocalypse Now Redux. And it’s precisely the differences between the two missions that indicate how the Americans might fare in this latest Southeast Asian intervention.
Formally, the Special Forces will be taking part in a routine, U.S.-Philippines joint military exercise. Their task will be to train two light reaction companies (about 1,200 troops) in techniques ranging from flying choppers at night to psychological-warfare operations–what national-security adviser Roilo Golez calls “on-the-job training.” They will be allowed to accompany Filipino troops into combat, but will be able to return fire only in self-defense. The operation is expected to last much longer than usual–at least until June, and possibly till the end of the year. At the same time the Pentagon is shipping planeloads of new gear to the outgunned Filipino military, including night-vision goggles, sniper rifles and advanced helicopters.
The one true similarity between Vietnam and the southern Philippines may be the mountainous, critter-infested terrain. Much of Basilan and Sulu is covered with thick foliage, which has hampered efforts to locate Abu Sayyaf bases from the air. On the ground, rebels melt into the jungle after fire fights. In some small towns and villages, the Abu Sayyaf has apparently relied on supporters who alert them to Army movements.
That said, these guerrillas are not the Vietcong. Current links to Al Qaeda have not been proved conclusively: the group’s founder, Abdurajak Janjalani, was allegedly recruited by a brother-in-law of Osama bin Laden’s as one of several hundred Filipinos who joined the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan in the 1980s. According to Filipino authorities, Janjalani formed the Abu Sayyaf when he returned with funds provided by the same brother-in-law. Some Abu Sayyaf rebels are related to members of larger Muslim separatist groups in the southern Philippines, and at first the insurgents did claim to be fighting for an autonomous Muslim homeland. But in recent years they have acted much more like petty criminals than freedom fighters, kidnapping locals and foreigners–including an American missionary couple whom they still hold–for millions of dollars in ransom money. (Estimates range from $10 million to $70 million.) They are thought to number no more than 800 fighters.
Some of that money has gone to buy state-of-the-art weaponry, against which the U.S. arsenal will no doubt prove helpful. Some, according to persistent reports, has gone to pay off local authorities for protection and even Army commanders when troops have gotten too close. (Philippine Army officials investigated a June 2001 incident when rebel leaders escaped despite being surrounded; an internal report concluded bungling, not corruption, was to blame.) Having U.S. troops on the front lines should ensure that no private deals are cut.
If the enemy is different this time, so is the ally. Manila is eager not to appear subservient to Washington, rejecting the Pentagon’s offer of U.S. combat troops and making it clear that Filipino commanders will lead any assault on the Abu Sayyaf. The Philippine Constitution bans all foreign troops except those covered by treaty, such as the agreement covering war games. Most Filipinos seem confident that that legal barrier will keep the U.S. presence from growing.
Unfortunately, probably the pre-eminent lesson of Vietnam is that jungle warfare does not follow neat and tidy rules. If the Abu Sayyaf proves resilient, the loophole that has allowed this small U.S. presence could be widened. A local backlash could in turn trigger new security problems, including a boost for the underground communist rebels of the New People’s Army, which has doubled in size from 6,000 to 12,000 fighters since 1998. The past may not be a bad thing to keep in mind right now.
