The Clintonites knew long ago that the deficit numbers were going to be worse than expected. When the Bush administration released even gloomier deficit projections last week, the Clintonites rushed to turn the bad news into another case of Bush’s economic bungling rather than a Clinton broken promise. That’s called spin control, early evidence that the Clinton folks have no intention of abandoning that practiced campaign technique once they’re in office. On the contrary, Clinton’s team plans to turn the White House into a mighty Wurlitzer of political propaganda. Clinton’s use of symbols-the bus trips, the appearances on “Donahue”-was critical to his winning campaign effort. Now Clinton veterans want to reimpose that kind of message control on the White House. After the Inauguration, the inner circle will reincarnate the campaign’s “war room” in the West Wing as a nexus of the “three Ps”: press, policy and politics. The notion is to create a “perpetual campaign” to win Clinton’s program and, not coincidentally, re-election in 1996.
Will it work? Running a campaign is a different proposition from running the country. At least during the campaign, Clinton had only the Republicans to worry about. In Washington, he will fight wars on a number of fronts, including within his own administration.
The goal of running the White House on a campaign footing is to use the press and public to break government gridlock. The best model is Ronald Reagan, who went over the heads of Democratic leaders in Congress to win his conservative agenda in the early ’80s. “The Great Communicator” did it with stirring speeches and carefully contrived photo opportunities. Clinton’s technique will be somewhat different. New technology-wireless mikes and minicams and 800 numbers-will allow Clinton to continue his voter-friendly “Donahue” imitation as a chief executive who can roam from the Oval Office to the local mall.
Clinton’s war room will be run by campaign veterans like George Stephanopoulos, expected to be named White House communications and strategy director this week. He will get help from campaign consultants Paul Begala and Mandy Grunwald and pollster Stan Greenberg, who will all man outposts in the Democratic National Committee (chaired by campaign manager David Wilhelm). And Clinton will try to salt enough Friends of Bill into the lower rungs of the government to create the biggest network of political dependents since Lyndon Johnson’s. The White House will also computerize lists of Clinton’s supporters and contributors, so they can be mobilized at a moment’s notice to lobby recalcitrant lawmakers.
All of this machinery is impressive, but it may fall apart under the strains of Beltway backstabbing. If a couple of cabinet officials start sniping at each other, or if the press gets the scent of a scandal, the most carefully orchestrated message of the day can get lost in the din. Already Clinton is setting himself up for some serious intramural battles. For example, transition staffers are now fighting over whether Clinton will honor his campaign promise to issue an executive order instantly overturning the military’s ban on gays or whether he will allow the Pentagon to drag out the process through bureaucratic channels.
During the campaign, Clinton could count on his eccentric political guru, James Carville, to run the war room like a boot camp and maintain “message discipline.” But Carville, who has no stomach for Washington bureaucratic battles, will be off making money as a political consultant and speaker. Clinton’s White House chief of staff, Thomas (Mack) McLarty, is said to be an all-round nice guy. He’s hardly the rube many Washington pundits think he is, but he may lack Carville’s jugular instinct. Some insiders fear that in his role as an honest broker, he will present too many options to the president. The man most in need of discipline may be Clinton himself. Ever eager to please, he is showing a preference for compromises that inevitably displease all sides.
In the end, the political machine will have to produce tangible results. The warroom rapid response and the endless talk shows will mean nothing if the economy is in the doldrums in 1996. Concedes Wilhelm: “If it’s image unconnected to substance, it won’t go very far.” Neither will Clinton’s perpetual campaign.
