In pursuing the goal of continental economic integration, however, we have sought to exclude workers. We tell ourselves that somehow, magically, we can integrate all markets except one: labor. But the interpersonal, institutional and cultural links that inevitably accompany market integration make international migration more, rather than less, likely.
To maintain the fiction that our borders will miraculously be permeable to all flows except labor, the United States has dramatically increased the size of the Border Patrol, raising its budget and personnel by a factor of six. It is now the largest arms-bearing branch of the federal government except the military itself, though what it defends both north and south is a peaceful border with a friendly neighbor. This exercise in self-deception has been costly. The militarization of the Mexican border did not raise the probability of apprehending undocumented Mexicans, reduce their numbers or induce those in America to go home. Washington is wasting in excess of $3 billion per year in border enforcement that needlessly kills hundreds of migrants annually by driving them into remote sectors where the risks to life and limb are great.
The paradoxical effect of militarizing the border has not been to lower the rate of entry, but to reduce the likelihood of return. Once they have run the gauntlet at the border, Mexicans are loath to do it again, so they hunker down, work hard and arrange for the entry of family members still abroad. As a result, over the past decade the rate of population growth among undocumented Mexicans has exploded. Mexicans now account for more than a third of all foreigners in the United States, up from 22 percent in 1990, and their numbers are growing at a rate of 6 percent per year. Our border policies have transformed a circular flow of male workers into a settled population of families, dramatically increasing the long-term costs to American taxpayers.
Our fundamental misapprehension is that Mexicans seek to move northward to settle permanently. In fact, like South Asians in the Gulf and Filipinos in Hong Kong, most Mexican illegals intend to work in the United States temporarily to earn money for some project at their place of origin: building a house, buying land, acquiring consumer goods. A concrete indicator of their continued attachment to Mexico is their annual repatriation of $12 billion to $14 billion to relatives at home. Left to their own devices, the overwhelming majority of migrants would make a few trips of relatively short duration and then retire back home to enjoy the fruits of their labors in the United States.
Another misconception is that Mexico is a poor country. It is not. Though its per capita income of about $9,000 (adjusted for purchasing power) is much lower than that of the United States ($38,000), it is high by developing-country standards. Mexico’s emigration is not a sign of poverty, but of rapid growth and structural transformation. Mexicans migrate not to escape abject poverty, but to earn funds to improve their position in the market economy being created under NAFTA.
Mexico is a country of 105 million people, with a $924 billion economy. America’s annual quota of 20,000 resident visas is ridiculously small–the same number allocated to Nepal, a distant country with 26 million people and no free-trade agreement with the United States. President George W. Bush’s proposals to increase access to legal immigration and establish a system of temporary employment visas are therefore a welcome change that moves the United States toward a policy of greater realism.
Rather than using repressive enforcement measures to stop flows of people that are a natural outgrowth of continental integration, we should bring the flow aboveboard. That would encourage the natural inclination of Mexican workers to return home, and facilitate their remittances to provide Mexico with a source of hard currency that it can apply toward development. The faster its economy grows, the sooner the incentives to leave will dwindle.
